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ABSTRACT 
Two recent developments have the potential to fundamentally alter the conventional view of EU 
trade policy-making: the emergence of global value chains (GVCs) and the recent backlash against 
globalization. In this paper we summarize the conventional wisdom after which we delineate the 
main expectations derived from the GVC and the globalization-backlash perspectives. In so doing, 
we focus on the EU’s trade and non-trade preferences, and the EU’s ability to achieve its preferences 
in international trade negotiations. We then discuss the research agenda that would allow testing 
the expectations derived from these different perspectives. A key point that emerges from this 
discussion is that the conventional perspective, the GVC perspective, and the globalization-backlash 
perspective may all be needed to fully understand EU trade policy. The challenge is to know under 
which conditions which of these perspectives best explains the process and outcomes of EU trade 
policy-making.  
 
Key words: EU trade policy; global value chains; anti-globalization  
 
 
 
 
	 2 
Introduction 
Research on EU trade policy generally views the EU’s trade interests as largely defined by the 
preferences of key domestic producers, as the EU aims to improve foreign market access for its 
exporters, while protecting domestic sectors threatened by foreign competition (Poletti and De 
Bièvre 2014). Its non-trade interests, such as protecting human rights or the environment, are 
subordinated to or even a function of its trade interests. Defending labour rights, for example, may 
be driven as much by the objective of limiting foreign competition as by genuine concern for foreign 
workers’ well-being. This conventional wisdom also views the EU as a powerful actor in international 
trade governance that manages to achieve policy outcomes largely in line with its trade and non-
trade interests.  
Two recent developments have the potential to fundamentally alter EU trade policy just as 
these findings are becoming broadly accepted. On the one hand, production is ever more 
geographically dispersed across the globe (Antras 2010). Especially producers in developed 
countries increasingly rely on the outsourcing of labour-intensive, less value-added operations to 
low(er) income countries (Lanz and Miroudot 2011). The resulting creation of global value chains 
(GVCs) (Gereffi 1999) may incentivize the political mobilization of pro-trade domestic constituencies 
and act as a constraint against protectionist interests (Eckhardt and Poletti 2018). On the other 
hand, developed countries experience a backlash against globalization (Rodrik 2018), with public 
opinion displaying greater levels of scepticism about the merits of free trade than in the past. This 
is best illustrated by the decision of British voters to leave the EU; vigorous opposition to the 
(eventually failed) negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA); and, more generally, by the 
growing electoral support enjoyed by protectionist parties and candidates in many EU member 
states (Colantone and Stanig 2018). This globalization backlash, by politicizing EU trade policy, has 
the potential to limit the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements and to alter the contents of trade 
agreements.  
What makes these two developments particularly interesting for research on EU trade policy 
is that in many respects they have opposite consequences. Whereas the increasing importance of 
GVCs should make EU trade policy more free-trade oriented, the globalization backlash should make 
it more protectionist. Moreover, GVCs should make the EU less interested in pushing non-trade 
interests in trade agreements, whereas the change in public attitudes may have the opposite effect. 
Finally, while GVCs should decrease EU bargaining power in international trade negotiations, the 
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growing public scepticism towards trade agreements should increase its bargaining power. In this 
paper, we present a research agenda that studies the impact of these two developments on EU 
trade policy. Although our focus is primarily on the EU’s role in international trade negotiations, we 
also refer to other areas of EU trade policy such as unilaterally imposed trade defence measures.    
 
The conventional wisdom on EU trade policy 
A rich literature on EU trade policy has emerged over the past two decades (see e.g. Conceição-
Heldt 2011; Dür 2017; Dür and Zimmerman 2007; Eckhardt 2015; Meunier 2005; Poletti and Sicurelli 
2018; Siles-Brügge 2014; Young and Peterson 2006; 2014). Much of this work starts from the 
assumption that policymakers act as transmission belts for the demands of organized domestic 
societal groups (Dür 2008). As in other political systems, EU policymakers are subjected to pressures 
from different domestic constituencies: they face demands by export-oriented sectors wishing to 
see better access to foreign markets, while also facing pressures from import-competing sectors 
wishing to reduce exposure to foreign competition domestically. Although the EU’s willingness to 
commit to trade liberalization ultimately depends on the relative balance of influence of these two 
groups – which in turn is influenced by the institutional context within which EU trade policy choices 
are made (Elsig 2002; Hanson 1998) – this view suggests that the EU should consistently strive to 
improve foreign market access for its exporters while protecting domestic sectors threatened by 
foreign competition (De Bièvre and Dür 2005). 
EU non-trade interests, according to this view, should be understood as a function of, or at 
least in combination with, its trade interests. The EU consistently used trade policy as a tool to 
promote non-trade issues (NTIs) such as labour and environmental standards, and human rights in 
foreign countries (Young and Peterson 2014). While some authors interpret this as a manifestation 
of the “normative” character of EU trade policy (Khorana and Garcia 2013), others show that the 
inclusion of NTIs in EU trade agreements is often in response to the demands of organized domestic 
interests wishing to impose costly regulatory burdens onto foreign competitors (Lechner 2016; 
Raess et al. 2018). This does not mean that genuine concerns for other countries’ labour or 
environmental conditions are absent altogether in the definition of EU non-trade interests. Recent 
works highlight that civil society organizations (CSOs) play an increasingly important role in EU trade 
policymaking (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015). Yet, because of generally low levels of public 
attention to EU trade policymaking, these groups tend to be more influential when they join forces 
with organized producers wishing to limit foreign competition (Poletti and Sicurelli 2016). This 
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suggests that genuine concerns for trading partners’ conditions are only likely to make their way 
into the definition of EU non-trade interests insofar as they are compatible with the EU’s underlying 
trade interests. 
The conventional wisdom also largely views the EU as a powerful trade actor capable to 
exercise substantial leverage on international trade politics. It can do so both because of the size of 
its domestic economy and share of global imports, and as a result of the particular characteristics 
of the rules and institutions governing EU trade policymaking. The large size of its domestic market 
increases the costs that its trading partners are willing to incur to gain access to it (Dür 2010; Damro 
2012). This means that the EU can effectively offer access to its large market in exchange for 
valuable concessions from its trading partners. At the same time, the high domestic trade policy 
decision-making thresholds generate the well-known paradox of weakness, which further increases 
the EU’s bargaining-power (Meunier 2005). As a result, according to the conventional view, the EU 
consistently manages to extract concessions from its trading partners and achieve policy outcomes 
in line with its trade- and non-trade interests. 
 
The GVC perspective on EU trade policy 
The globalization and fragmentation of trade, production, and distribution systems stands out as 
one of the most important developments in the contemporary international economy (Eckhardt and 
Poletti 2018). While traditionally largely taking place within the boundaries of the nation state, 
production and distribution are now increasingly geographically dispersed across the globe due to 
the growing reliance of producers in developed countries on the outsourcing of labour-intensive, 
less value-added operations to low(er) income countries (Lanz and Miroudot 2011).  
The EU is one of the main drivers of these ongoing processes of internationalization and 
fragmentation of production (Amador and Di Mauro 2015). European firms do not only import raw 
materials, but increasingly also intermediate goods and services. For example, in 2017 Peugeot 
bought €500 million worth of parts from Morocco for its European plants (Sigal 2018). In some cases, 
European firms also import finished goods, after having exported intermediate goods. Illustratively, 
European car manufacturers including Renault, Peugeot and Volkswagen are currently investing 
heavily in assembly plants in Algeria and Morocco. Some of the cars assembled in these plants may 
be imported into Europe, for sale on the European market (Sigal 2018). Moreover, imports of 
intermediates play a key role in European exports. In 2011, the foreign value added in Eurozone 
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exports stood at 21.2% of total exports, a markedly higher percentage than that for the US (15%) 
and Japan (17%) and similar to that for China (Amador and Di Mauro 2015). 
The GVC perspective on EU trade policy expects these developments to matter for EU trade 
policy in several ways. For one, the EU’s trade preferences should become more genuinely free 
trade oriented. As firms operating within GVCs increasingly depend on imports of intermediate 
goods and services, they can be expected to strongly support regional trade agreements that 
protect their supply chains (Chase 2003). They should also start expressing concerns about trade 
policies that could increase the costs of imports (Bernard et al. 2012). As a result, both the removal 
of domestic import-restricting policies and the reduction of regulatory burdens imposed onto 
foreign countries integrated in these transnational chains of production should become valued 
political objectives that increasingly stimulate the political mobilization of import-dependent firms. 
In fact, specifically for the EU, a growing number of studies shows that import-dependent firms have 
become crucial actors in the politics of EU trade policy. They 1) oppose the imposition of anti-
dumping measures (Eckhardt 2015; De Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011); 2) support trade liberalization 
through preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (Eckhardt and Poletti 2016); and 3) advocate swift 
compliance in WTO disputes (Yildirim 2016). Overall, the increasing political role of import-
dependent firms should strengthen the political weight and influence of pro-trade domestic 
coalitions. In line with this expectation, organized business groups were overwhelmingly unified in 
support of the TTIP negotiations in the EU (Young 2016).  
Regarding non-trade interests, the GVC perspective expects a decrease in the EU’s 
propensity to include NTIs with trading partners with which it is highly integrated in GVCs (Poletti 
and Sicurelli 2018). Unless they are linked to greater productivity, higher labour standards in a third 
country can make plants in that country less competitive, because they increase labour costs. For 
European firms exporting to these countries, this can be a competitive advantage. For European 
firms that – because of their involvement in GVCs – invest in or purchase intermediate goods from 
that country, however, the effect is just the opposite. For them, higher labour costs in the third 
country translate into higher costs for themselves. The same applies to environmental standards. 
With GVCs strengthening the group of foreign investors and importers compared to exporters, in 
the aggregate this should weaken European support for the inclusion of (strong and enforceable) 
non-trade provisions in trade agreements. 
Finally, the increasing importance of GVCs should decrease the EU’s bargaining power in 
trade negotiations, as the EU can no longer credibly use the threat to close its large market to gain 
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concessions from third countries. The more European firms become import dependent, the more 
they also become concerned about any interruptions of trade relations. If the costs of imports 
increase, this does not benefit but hurt them. Reductions of barriers to imports – be they tariffs or 
non-tariff barriers – by contrast benefit them. The EU thus can no longer use its own trade barriers 
as bargaining chip in trade negotiations with third countries. So, holding other factors constant (e.g. 
relative power asymmetries, trade partners’ preferences) the GVC perspective suggests a decrease 
of EU bargaining power in trade negotiations.  
 
The globalization backlash perspective on EU trade policy 
An increasing part of the population in developed countries considers that globalization has failed 
to provide opportunities for them, which has in turn fostered profound dis-illusion with both the 
‘elite’ and their global vision (Kobrin 2017). This is particularly so in the US, where anti-globalist and 
nationalist sentiments played a key role in the 2016 presidential campaign, but also in the EU, where 
the recent electoral victories of nationalist and populist movements in a number of member states 
are another manifestation of a revival of economic nationalism (Colantone and Stanig 2018).  
The reasons behind this backlash are complex and multifaceted. What seems evident is that 
the global financial crisis and its aftermath has refuelled scepticism in Western democracies about 
the gains from trade (Eckhardt and Curran 2019; Kobrin 2017). Moreover, recent research shows 
that high levels of exposure to the vagaries of international economic competition, in particular 
Chinese import shocks, are highly correlated with rising anti-globalization sentiments (Colantone 
and Stanig 2018a). This backlash, however, is not only driven by economic concerns, but also results 
from broader grievances about the impact of globalization on national identity and culture (Rodrik 
2018).  
The globalization backlash perspective on EU trade policy stresses the important 
consequences of this development for EU trade policy. For one, growing popular scepticism about 
the merits of trade liberalization should make EU trade policy more protectionist. In fact, trade 
protectionism has figured prominently in the policy proposals of populist/nationalist movements 
and politicians. Public concerns about trade also have already led to important policy reversals. In 
the US, a trade sceptic won the 2016 presidential election; pulled the US out of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and renegotiated NAFTA; while imposing a flurry of new tariffs (Noland 2018). In France, 
the far-right presidential candidate – running on a programme of economic patriotism, 
protectionism and leaving the EU – received an unprecedented third of the vote in 2017 (Eckhardt 
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and Curran 2019). Distrust of trade in the EU also crystalized around fierce resistance in numerous 
member states to TTIP and CETA (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015) and protests against EU’s initiative 
to grant China ‘market economy status,’ which would make it harder for the EU to impose 
protectionist trade defence measures on Chinese imports (Angel 2016).  
To be sure, other recent EU trade negotiations and trade policy initiatives have taken place 
in the absence of any significant public uproar. Yet, the aforementioned unprecedented domestic 
political turmoil triggered by EU trade policy initiatives shows the growing popular disillusion with 
globalization, which in turn has created greater opportunities for policymakers and organized 
societal interests to pick on and exploit these sentiments, pushing EU trade policy in a more 
protectionist direction relative to the past. 
Next to more protectionism and less support for trade agreements, the globalization 
backlash perspective suggests that EU trade policy should attach growing important to NTIs. As 
European citizens become increasingly sceptical of trade agreements, they should demand strong 
non-trade provisions to accompany any trade liberalization. “Unfair” competition – namely imports 
that are cheaper than domestic production supposedly because of lower foreign labour or 
environmental standards – should be a key concern for them. We thus should see a more sincere 
EU demand for the inclusion of NTIs in trade agreements than expected by the conventional 
wisdom.  
Finally, the increased public scrutiny of EU trade policymaking that results from the backlash 
to globalization should strengthen the EU’s hand in trade negotiations. The more sceptical public 
opinion in the EU, the more difficult ratification of trade agreements, which in turn means that the 
EU can more credibly demand additional concessions in trade negotiations. 
 
A research agenda on EU trade policy 
Given the contradictory expectations that derive from the conventional wisdom, and the GVCs and 
globalization backlash perspectives, the challenge is to find out under which circumstances which 
perspective best explains the EU’s trade preferences, non-trade preferences, and bargaining power. 
In the following, we suggest avenues to achieve this aim. We also propose possible ways to integrate 
the three perspectives into a coherent research agenda.  
 
EU trade preferences 
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While the GVCs and globalization backlash perspectives both challenge the conventional wisdom, 
they suggest opposite consequences with regard to EU trade preferences. The GVC perspective 
expects EU trade policy to become more free-trade oriented, whereas the globalization backlash 
perspective expects EU trade policy to become more protectionist. So which of these perspectives 
can best explain contemporary EU trade preferences? To start developing general propositions on 
this important question, future research should strive to unpack the full set of causal mechanisms 
that connect the distributive consequences of trade liberalization and individual-level attitudes 
towards EU trade policy. One of the major findings of the most recent US trade policy literature is 
that trade liberalization generates an uneven reallocation of profits in favour of large and GVC-
integrated firms at the expense of small and medium-sized ones (Baccini et al. 2017). This literature 
suggests that the growing popular opposition to trade liberalization may be partly related to the 
fact that GVCs, while smoothing out some producers’ opposition towards free-trade, may also 
contribute to a greater concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, at the expense of the many, 
as often claimed by critics of globalization (Osgood 2017). The EU trade policy literature should 
investigate whether similar developments can be observed for European countries, and whether 
these developments matter for individual trade attitudes.  
Next to analysing the actual income effects of trade liberalization, it is also crucial to 
understand how these dynamics affect patterns of political mobilization by trade-related interests 
in different EU member states, and how these influence trade policy discussions in the media. For 
instance, the US trade policy literature shows that the growing importance of trade-related inter-
firm distributive conflicts led to an increasing role of individual firms at the expense of sectoral 
associations in trade policy lobbying (Kim 2017). For the EU, similar studies are so far lacking.  
At the same time, it is now widely established that trade-related interest groups can increase 
the public salience of trade policy issues (Dür and Mateo 2014), as well as influence individual-level 
attitudes through the frames they manage to convey (Dür 2018). Lobbying by organized interests 
and public opinion thus are not independent of each other. Research on EU trade policy hence needs 
to study both in parallel, to find out how the emergence of GVCs and the globalization backlash 
interact in shaping contemporary EU trade preferences.   
This discussion also suggests ways in which the GVC and globalization backlash perspectives 
can be integrated into a coherent research agenda to understand the politics underlying the 
definition of EU trade interests.  First, the EU trade policy literature should engage in an empirical 
assessment of how the growing integration of the EU economy in GVCs matters for the distribution 
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of income. This would best be done using firm-level data, as trade may have heterogeneous effects 
within sectors. Second, research should analyse whether, and if so how, changing distributive 
conflicts systematically affect trade policy lobbying. Of particular importance here are the questions 
whether firms have grown in importance in EU trade policy lobbying and, eventually, what the 
implications of this process are for how EU trade preferences come to be aggregated. This needs to 
be linked to an analysis of how trade policy discussions are framed in the media, since media framing 
is likely to matter for citizens’ trade attitudes. And finally, EU trade policy scholars should investigate 
how these processes relate to anti-globalization sentiments and the politicization of trade 
policymaking in different EU member states and at the EU level.  
 
EU non-trade preferences 
The GVCs and globalization-backlash perspectives also lead to opposite expectations with respect 
to the non-trade interests of the EU. Whereas the former predicts less, the latter predicts greater 
EU concern for non-trade issues. Future research on EU trade policy thus will need to find out under 
which conditions the GVCs perspective and under which conditions the globalization-backlash 
perspective can better account for the politics surrounding the EU’s pursuit of non-trade interest 
with its trade policy. As a country becomes more important as a source for intermediate inputs into 
European production processes, do we see a heightened or reduced demand for the inclusion of 
new (or the strict enforcement of existing) non-trade provisions in a trade agreement with that 
country? Does the demand for non-trade issues vary at all over time and across agreements?  
In order to answer these questions, further research should strive to acquire more data on 
two sets of issues related to EU non-trade preferences. Firstly, better data is needed to grasp how 
different types of GVC-integration relate to business lobbying over non-trade issues and how this, 
in turn, affects the relative balance of societal interests on this issue. Recent research shows that 
GVCs do not unequivocally lower business demands for non-trade issues. Malesky and Mosley 
(2018), for instance, show that firms in developing countries will be most inclined to improve their 
labour standards when servicing foreign markets that offer relatively greater product mark-ups. 
Lechner (2018), moreover, finds that labour standards increase FDI in high-skilled labour-abundant 
sectors in developing countries. These findings suggest that, under certain conditions, the GVCs and 
globalization backlash perspectives may push in similar directions.  
Secondly, there is a need to systematically combine data on lobbying activities with data on 
individual-level attitudes over trade policy. This is so because the relative influence of GVCs and 
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globalization backlash on non-trade issues in the EU seems to vary across trade agreements. 
Illustratively, in February 2018 the EU publicly committed to not signing a trade agreement with any 
country that has not ratified the Paris climate change agreement. As a result, the EU Japan trade 
agreement includes a provision that commits both sides to uphold the Paris agreement. By contrast, 
as of 2019 the EU pursues a trade agreement with the US, although the latter country decided to 
quit the Paris agreement. Is this variation a result of policymakers ignoring public demands for more 
attention to climate change in the face of a strong corporate lobbying effort for an EU-US trade 
agreement? 
 
EU bargaining power in trade negotiations 
As outlined above, the two perspectives also lead to contradictory expectations regarding the EU’s 
power in international trade negotiations. The GVC perspective predicts that the more import-
dependent EU firms become, the more concerned about trade barriers they will be, which in turn 
will decrease EU bargaining power because the EU can no longer use the threat to close its own 
market to gain concessions from its negotiating partners. If the GVC perspective is correct, 
therefore, the EU’s power should vary across trading partners and possibly even across sectors, 
depending on the extent of GVC trade. Future research should test these propositions. It would also 
be interesting to study variation in import-dependence and GVC integration between EU member 
states and whether this has a bearing on the EU’s ability to speak with a single voice, one important 
factor influencing the EU’s bargaining power during trade negotiations (Conceição-Heldt and 
Meunier 2014; but see Elsig 2007).  
The aforementioned variation in the EU’s power across trading partners should also be 
apparent in terms of its ability to achieve its non-trade objectives. Research has shown that third 
countries often resist the inclusion of non-trade provisions in trade agreements (Harrison et al. 
2018), in which case the EU needs to use part of its bargaining power in the negotiations to achieve 
its objective. To the extent that GVCs reduce the EU’s bargaining power, therefore, also the EU’s 
ability to link non-trade issues to trade should suffer.  
At the same time, if the globalization backlash perspective is correct, we should see that the 
EU’s bargaining power varies depending on the public salience of trade agreements: the more 
publicly salient a trade agreement, the more important is a sceptical public opinion. By contrast, for 
trade agreements that garner hardly any public attention, the globalization backlash should matter 
little.  
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Future research thus should investigate to which extent the EU’s bargaining power co-varies 
with the existence of GVCs or with the degree of public salience. Such variation can exist both over 
time and across trading partners but should be present for both trade and non-trade issues. Most 
interesting are cases of trade negotiations where GVCs and public salience do not go hand-in-hand, 
that is, cases with strongly developed GVCs but low public attention or weakly developed GVCs and 
high public attention. For these cases, the two mechanisms outlined above should be visible. In 
other cases, the two mechanisms should offset each other. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that the emergence of GVCs and the recent backlash against globalization have the 
potential to alter conventional views of EU trade policy. These developments are particularly 
interesting as they lead to contradictory expectations on how the EU pursues its trade and non-
trade interests, as well as on its bargaining power in international trade negotiations. A key point 
that emerges from our discussion is that the conventional perspective, the GVC perspective, and 
the globalization-backlash perspective may all be needed to fully understand EU trade policy in the 
years to come. We therefore proposed possible ways to integrate these three perspectives into a 
coherent research agenda with a view to confronting what we believe will be the major challenge 
for researchers working in this field: developing general propositions on conditions under which 
these perspectives can best explain the process and outcomes of EU trade policy-making. 
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